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This paper conducts an in-depth analysis of structured finance asset-backed securities collateralized debt 
obligations (SF ABS CDOs), the subset of CDOs that traded on the ABS CDO desks at the major 
investment banks and were a major contributor to the August 2007 financial panic. We identify these 
CDOs with data from Intex
©. We estimate that 727 publicly traded SF ABS CDOs were issued between 
1999 and 2007, totaling $641 billion. We describe how and why multi-sector CDOs became subprime 
CDOs and show why they were so susceptible to catastrophic loss. We then track the flows of subprime 
bonds into CDOs to document the enormous cross-referencing of subprime BBB bonds and credit default 
swaps (CDSs) into CDOs. We also show that lower rated tranches of CDOs were not sold and were 
largely recycled into CDO
2s and other CDOs. We estimate that total write-downs on SF ABS CDOs will 
be $420 billion, 65% of the original issuance balance. We then analyze the determinants of expected 
losses on the deals and AAA bonds and examine the performance of dealers and rating agencies. Finally, 




I.  Introduction 
 
How much will total write-downs be on the universe of CDOs at the center of “the Panic of 2007”?
 2 We 
set out to answer this question not only to resolve speculation about the amount of the write-downs but 
also to get an understanding of the exact size and composition of the market.
3 Resolving this question and 
determining our bottom line figure of $420 billion of write-downs on $641 billion of issuance turned out 
to be a complicated undertaking, but for reasons much different than expected. The actual pricing of the 
CDO securities was among the more straightforward parts of our analysis. What proved to be much more 
difficult were several of the more basic parts of our research. First among them was defining the universe 
of publicly traded CDOs that traded on the major ABS CDO desks; these CDOs are considered a major 
factor in the panic that erupted in financial markets in August 2007 (Gorton (2008); Covitz, Liang, and 
Suarez (2009)).  Developing a robust classification for the SF ABS CDO market and then identifying the 
727 CDOs that comprise this market was complicated because we could not find any source that 
attempted to define this market in a systematic way. Once we identified them, it cleared up much of the 
confusion about the size, composition, and institutional features of the SF ABS CDO market as well as 
making clear how and why this market came to be dominated by subprime securities, increasingly of the 
synthetic type. Surprisingly, tallying life-to-date write-downs proved more difficult than the valuation 
exercise for still active securities, which is most important to do since write-downs already incurred make 
up 71% of our $420 billion estimate. Finally, standardizing data across the many different structures 
presented a number of challenges that, once resolved, gave us valuable information for our analysis.  
 
Academic studies suffer from informational gaps when attempting to investigate this market because 
researchers lack the primary data necessary to undergo a thorough analysis of the SF ABS CDO market. 
To do this analysis, one needs access to, and expert knowledge of, monthly data files and valuation 
software from Intex, which we will show is the source data for the universe of publicly issued private-
label mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
4 as well as publicly traded SF ABS CDOs.
5 For investment 
banking research and trading, Intex provides the primary source data and valuation tools (see Goodman, 
et al. 2008).
6 What does make our study unique is that investment banks have no interest in conducting a 
study of a market that has completely shut down and which has generated such extraordinary write-
downs, many at the same banks. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we pose a series of questions whose answers provide 
insights into how $641 billion of SF ABS CDOs could generate $420 billion of write-downs. First, we 
describe our methodology for defining and sizing the SF ABS CDO market. We estimate that 727 
                                                            
2 This characterization of the financial crisis beginning in 2007 is by Gorton (2008). 
3 One early figure from a credible source had losses of $500 billion on a trillion dollars of issuance. See CreditFlux 
Newsletter, January 8, 2008. Lewis (2010) ended his book without knowing what losses on CDOs were or what the 
size of the market was.  
4 Private-label, or nonagency, MBS refers to those securities not issued by the three agencies, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA). 
5 This surprisingly little-known company is immortalized in a 2009 article in New York magazine by Osinski (2009), 
who explains how he wrote the program for the Intex DealMaker
TM that became “the bomb that blew up Wall 
Street.” 
6 Barnett-Hart (2009) was able to indirectly use Intex with “Lehman Live,” a database of some 735 CDOs compiled 
by Lehman Brothers. We confirmed that Intex is the source data, but LehmanLive includes 142 deals that we don’t 
include and misses 134 deals that we do. 4 
 
publicly traded SF ABS CDOs were issued between 1999 and 2007 totaling $641 billion. All told, $201 
billion of the underlying collateral of CDOs was composed of synthetic references, or credit default swaps 
(CDSs). Next we describe why these CDOs were so susceptible to catastrophic loss by examining 
subordination levels of different bonds and ex ante views about losses and house price appreciation in 
2005 when CDO issuance exploded.  We then describe how multi-sector CDOs evolved into subprime 
CDOs. Then we track through the flows of subprime securities into CDOs to show how $64 billion of 
BBB-rated subprime bonds became $140 billion of CDO collateral. We also document how most lower-
rated tranches of CDOs were mostly recycled into other CDOs. In Section III, we describe how we 
extracted data from Intex and other sources and produce summary statistics. In Section IV, we describe 
our process for first compiling write-downs and then our approach for generating expected write-downs to 
arrive at our $420 billion figure. In Section V, we extend the work of Barnett-Hart (2009) to analyze the 
determinants of write-downs on the universe of SF ABS CDO bonds.
7 In Section VI, we conclude by 
summarizing our findings, assessing the subprime CDO crisis, and discussing areas for future work. 
 
II.  The SF ABS CDO Market 
We begin our analysis in subsection A by describing the structural features of SF ABS CDOs and 
estimating the exact size and composition of the market. In subsection B we show why these CDOs were 
so susceptible to catastrophic loss. In subsection C, we describe why the market came to be dominated by 
subprime securities. In subsection D, we track the flows of subprime mortgage bonds into CDOs and 
CDO bonds into other CDOs and CDO
2s to document the astonishing amount of cross-referencing that 
took place in these CDOs.  
 
A.  What Is the Exact Size and Composition of the SF ABS CDO Market? 
Before defining the SF ABS CDO market, we briefly describe the private-label mortgage securitization 
process and how CDOs were constructed. Figure 1 is a stylized visualization of the transformation of 
mortgage loans to mortgage-backed securities to SF ABS CDOs and, finally, to CDO
2s. While this chart 
is represented elsewhere,
8 unique to this work is the inclusion of actual figures on the size of the various 
submarkets from the analysis we describe below, as well as some structural features of the securities. As 
shown, between 1998 and 2007, a total of $3.3 trillion of mortgage loans were placed into RMBS 
securities (i.e., prime or Alt-A securities) and $2.5 trillion into home equity (HE) securities (i.e., mostly 
subprime but also some junior lien and “scratch and dent” loans), for a total of $5.8 trillion of private-
label MBS issuance.
9 Mortgage loans are the assets (collateral) for the RMBS and HE securities; 
liabilities are issued in a senior/subordinated structure. Exactly why prime and Alt-A securities are 
classified as RMBS while subprime securities are classified as ABS is described below.  
 
                                                            
7 We are especially indebted to Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, who shared her data with us, allowing us to 
understand her sources and learn from them as we developed our own database. 
8 This depiction was originally done by UBS in Goodman et al. (2008) and reprinted in Gorton (2008), but using 
only representative numbers for tranche sizes.  
9 This figure matches almost exactly the figure of $5.66 trillion of private-label MBS issuance from 1998 to 2007 
reported by Inside Mortgage Finance (2010), the unofficial keeper of U.S. ABS/MBS data. The IMF obtains its 
figures from independent sources. The minuscule difference is likely due to a small number of privately placed 
MBS. 5 
 
CDOs are constructed using RMBS and HE securities as assets. CDO liabilities are also set up in a 
senior/sub structure. Generally, bonds with a credit rating of A or above were placed into so-called “high 
grade” CDOs; BBB-rated bonds were placed into “mezzanine” CDOs.
10 Based on our classification 
described below, $342 billion of high grade and $299 billion of mezzanine CDOs were issued from 1998-
2007. The final link in the chain is the CDO
2s, whose underlying collateral is primarily CDO bonds. 
Forty-eight SF ABS CDO
2s were issued totaling $31 billion. Our classification for CDO
2s was done by 
using the simple rule that CDOs made up at least 50% of total deal collateral.
11 
 
As described, Intex contains the universe of publicly traded private-label MBS; it also contains the universe of 
publicly traded “144A” SF ABS CDOs issued through these markets.
12 But Intex contains some $1.4 trillion of 
CDOs issued between 1998 and 2007, so our central challenge is to define the subset of CDOs that traded on the 
“ABS CDO desks” at the major investment banks and asset-management firms. This is important because these 
desks were where trading took place and where pricing and fair value information was generated and 
exchanged. In particular, information generated at the ABS CDO desks in 2007 played a critical role in 
launching the financial crisis, so we are most interested in identifying the universe of securities that traded there. 
 
 First, CDOs are classified as “structured finance” in Intex if the CDOs can be “actively managed.”  SF CDOs 
generally have a reinvestment period, usually up to five years, when collateral managers are allowed to purchase 
new assets or sell credit risky assets from the CDO. Mortgage-backed CDOs are allowed to be actively 
managed because prepayment risk is high and CDOs can pay down quickly without replacement. In contrast, 
CMBS or CRE CDOs are mostly “static pools” because commercial mortgages have prepayment penalties or 
yield-maintenance clauses that effectively eliminate prepayment risk.
13 The static pool feature of CMBS and the 
whole loan feature of CRE are reasons CMBS/CRE traded on the CMBS/CRE desks separately at the large 
investment banks. This is important because studies frequently mix CRE CDOs with SF CDOs.  
 
Of course, since CDO structures comprise whatever dealers can sell, there are exceptions to this classification, 
most notably the 68 static ABS CDO pools that emerged with the growth of the synthetic market.
14 We continue 
to define these deals as SF CDOs if they included subprime MBS, since these deals also traded on the ABS 
CDO desks. 
 
A second distinction is made between corporate CDOs and ABS CDOs. It is also the case that there are separate 
desks where corporate CDOs, collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and high-yield collateralized bond 
obligations (CBOs) were underwritten and traded. Therefore, by adding the “ABS” qualifier, we exclude from 
                                                            
10 This is only a stylized model because, in practice, it is the weighted average rating that determines the 
classification calculations we do below, so bonds with all different ratings can appear in each. 
11 We needed to establish a cutoff because 628 of the 727 CDOs had at least some CDOs as collateral.  
12 Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933 allows private companies to sell unregistered securities (the Rule 144 
securities) to qualified institutional buyers (QIB) through a broker dealer. The rule also permits QIBs to trade these 
securities among themselves. To be a QIB, the institution must control a securities portfolio of $100 million or more. 
Because of the unregistered status of these securities, disclosure is often not as complete as in public securities. 
13 Fabozzi (2007) argues that, because of these features, CMBS trade more like corporate bonds.  
14 For the synthetics, which make up most of the static deals, investors often opted not to allow replacement, since 
they were made up entirely of CDSs. 6 
 
our classification of SF ABS CDOs the CLO and CBO CDOs, whose underlying collateral is primarily made up 
of high-yield leveraged loans and corporate bonds.
15 
 
A final classification we make is to distinguish high grade and mezzanine CDOs. This classification involves 
using a weighting scale derived from initial rating agency ratings.  As is industry practice, we define a deal with 
a Moody’s weighted average rating factor (WARF) of 180 or lower to be high grade; WARFs greater than 180 
are classified as mezzanine.
16 For deals for which WARFs are not available, we used the Fitch score.
17 For deals 
with no Moody’s WARF or Fitch score available in Intex, we examined the underlying collateral of the CDOs 
using S&P ratings to determine risk classifications.  
 
As shown in Table 1, we estimate that the universe of publicly traded SF ABS CDOs totals 727 deals with $641 
billion of issuance. Of the total $641 billion of SF ABS CDO issuance, $342 billion is high grade (255 deals), 
and $299 billion is mezzanine (472 deals). Note that while mezzanine issuance balances are 47% of total SF 
ABS CDO issuance balances, mezzanine deals constitute 65% of all SF ABS CDO securities. This is the result 
of the very small size of BBB-rated bonds in a given RMBS relative to A-rated bonds and the lower leverage 
needed for mezzanine SF ABS CDOs to make the economics of a mezzanine deal work versus a high grade 
deal. The vintage breakouts are especially meaningful for our loss estimates, since later vintages will be 
especially hard hit by the mortgage crisis. Note that almost two-thirds of CDOs were issued in 2006-07. 
 
Finally, based on our ability to identify the CDSs within each CDO, we are able to compute a precise dollar 
amount and share of synthetic collateral in SF ABS CDOs. As shown in Table 2, $201 billion of SF ABS CDO 
collateral issued was in the form of synthetic credit default swaps (CDSs). Synthetics make up 31% of SF CDO 
collateral. Note that 93% of the synthetic CDO collateral was issued after the first half of 2005. In July 2005, the 
International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) Master Agreement for MBS was finalized, which 
standardized over-the-counter CDS transactions for MBS. Another development was the introduction of the 
ABX indexes in January 2006, which were often referenced in these CDOs and which provided much liquidity 
with which to execute CDSs.
18  
 
B.  Why Were SF ABS CDOs Susceptible to Catastrophic Loss? 
Figure 1 also contains information on the average subordination levels on the bonds in each class of 
securities. “Subordination” is a summary measure of how high collateral losses need to be before the 
bonds suffer losses. First, note that lower rated bonds have less subordination than higher rated bonds 
across all asset classes. Note also that AAA RMBS bonds have the lowest amount of subordination at 6%, 
while the AAA CDO
2 bonds have the highest at 26%. Generally speaking, losses on the CDO
2s need to 
reach 26% before the senior AAA bondholders take a loss, while losses would need to reach only 6% for 
                                                            
15 See also Fabozzi (2007, p. 327) for a breakout of different types of CDOs. CLO CDOs were frequently placed 
into the CDO
2 category in Intex, since a defining feature of CLO CDOs is that they include other CLO bonds. 
16  The weighted average rating factors of a CDO (WARFs) is calculated by weight-averaging the rating factor of 
each underlying collateral asset.  
17 A Fitch score of 7 or lower is defined as high grade; a Fitch score greater than 7 is defined as mezzanine. S&P, the 
other major rating agency, had no comparable numerical weighting scale.  
18 There are four ABX.HE indices, ABX.HE.06.1, 06.2, 07.1, and 07.2, each composed of 20 representative 
subprime securities issued over the previous six months. They were a key trading tool for banks and asset managers 
to hedge or take a position in the subprime market. See Gorton (2008). 7 
 
RMBS AAA bonds to suffer losses.
19 This is because RMBS is the least risky class, and CDO
2s the most 
risky. 
 
These summary subordination figures help explain why these CDOs were so susceptible to catastrophic 
loss. Note that the average subordination levels of the junior AAA-rated bonds of the mezzanine CDOs 
(25%) and CDO
2s (26%) have comparable levels of subordination to those of the AAA HE mortgage 
bonds (23%).
20 But mezzanine CDOs’ collateral is made up primarily of BBB-rated subprime securities, 
not houses. Subprime mortgage losses need to reach only 8%, the average subordination level for the A-
rated bonds, before the BBB-rated bonds are completely written down. According to Gerardi, et al. 
(2008), consensus views on losses in early 2007 ranged from 3% to 5% for subprime deals. This means 
that losses would need to reach 5 to 8 times their expected levels before AAA-rated subprime bonds 
suffered their first dollar loss. Assuming bonds fail concomitantly, losses would need to reach only 1.5 to 
2.5 times their expected levels before the mezzanine CDOs became completely worthless.  
 
An even more revealing piece of evidence comes from a study by Lehman (2005), which conducted bond 
analysis on new subprime issuance in 2005 across different house price appreciation (HPA) scenarios. 
Lehman’s conclusion: “New issue BBB subordinates have downgrade risk if HPA slows to 5% by end-
2005.” Their overall assessment was that “BBB subordination appears to be sized to an intermediate 
scenario between a 5% and 8% HPA for life.”
21  
 
What allowed the rating agencies to design CDOs in this way was an assumption of low asset correlations 
among the bonds in the CDOs. This assumption made more sense when the CDOs were truly multi-
sector, as we will see was the case from 1998 to 2002. After 2002, when these CDOs became increasingly 
dominated by subprime MBS bonds, rating agencies changed their methodology to assign diversification 
benefits across different CDO dealers (see Moody’s 2005). But as Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009, p. 
16) point out, “The overlap in geographic locations and within mortgage pools raised the prospect of 
higher-than-expected default correlations.” For example, had Citigroup issued subprime MBS made up of 
loans mostly in the Northeast, while Lehman’s MBS had been mostly from California, assigning 
diversification benefits across issuers would make sense. But geographic diversification occurred within 
the subprime MBS because rating agencies gave more favorable ratings for doing so.
22 Also, virtually all 
subprime securitizations were done shortly after origination, which meant that they were all from the 
same vintages.
23 Thus, subprime MBS were highly correlated with each other by design. Below we will 
show that correlations were made even higher by placing or referencing the same bonds into many CDOs. 
 
In sum, SF ABS CDOs were susceptible to catastrophic loss after they became subprime CDOs because 
subordination levels were set too low for their highly correlated design. Reinforcing this, the main 
                                                            
19 Because of a feature called “over-collateralization,” more assets could be pledged to the deal than liabilities 
created, which added additional protection for bonds. This is shown in Figure 1 by more total balances of mortgage 
loans going into the RMBS and HE securities ($3.31T and $2.49T) than total MBS securities ($3.15T and $2.44T).   
20 Median subordination levels were similar at 21% for AAA HE MBS and 23% for junior AAA mezzanine CDOs.  
21 See Lehman (2005, p. 2.). Interestingly, one of the co-authors, Sihan Shu, reportedly went to work for John 
Paulson, the hedge fund manager that reaped billions of dollars of profits by shorting the subprime market. 
22 See Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010, p. 13). 
23 The exception would be resecurizations of existing MBS, but these are not considered in our analysis. 8 
 
underlying collateral of the CDOs, the BBB subprime bonds, were structured to unsustainable 
fundamentals (“5% to 8% HPA for life”) starting in at least 2005. 
 
C.  How Did SF ABS CDOs Become “Subprime CDOs”? 
A critical point for understanding the subprime CDO crisis is to understand why subprime securities traded on 
ABS desks and came to dominate SF ABS CDOs. Historically, the typical subprime borrower “used a home 
equity loan to consolidate consumer debt using the current home as collateral rather than to obtain funds to 
purchase a new home” (Fabozzi (2007, p. 313)). For this reason, subprime securities traded on ABS desks. 
Conversely, prime and Alt-A loans traded through the RMBS, or “Resi,” desks. Fabozzi (2007, pp. 296-97) 
characterizes RMBS as “securities backed by 1- to 4-family single residential mortgages with a first lien,” 
mainly prime “jumbo” loans with loan balances too large to be insured by the agencies. Alt-A loans did not 
qualify for agency purchase because of the more limited documentation requirements, but they fit more closely 
into the definition of RMBS. Therefore, Wall Street jumbo and Alt-A “shelves” traded on the RMBS desks. The 
big Wall Street trading desks determined how Intex delivered its “deal libraries,” separately between RMBS and 
Home Equity, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
The dominance of subprime in SF ABS CDOs also had another cause: it was preferred by the rating agencies, 
whose views were driven by the poor performance of “multi-sector” CDOs issued during the 2000-2001 
recession. This is also extremely important, since ratings are a requirement for CDO issuance, and the rating 
agencies’ views about the collateral mix determined how CDOs could be placed in the market. Moody’s views 
on “structured finance CDOs” were described by Hu (2007, p. 46) this way: 
 
In the aftermath of the 2000-2001 economic recession, the poor performance of HY CBOs, 
manufactured housing ABS, franchise loan ABS, and aircraft lease ABS led to losses in the underlying 
pools of many early SF CDOs….The industry realized that diversification just for diversification’s sake 
was not the most prudent collateral management strategy. Meanwhile, asset managers moved away 
from poorly performing asset types to strongly performing and traditional asset types such as RMBS, 
with which they were most familiar. 
 
Of special note by Moody’s was the increased use of subprime collateral for CDO issuance, which Hu (2007, p. 
47) described as the result of several factors, including wide spreads, the rise of synthetics, and the ability to 
“produce loan collateral on a massive basis,” which the CDO dealers willingly obliged the rating agencies.  
Thus, the rise of subprime CDOs was driven by a combination of the trading of subprime securities on the ABS 
desks, attractive yields, large issuance volumes, and rating agency practice. 
 
Figure 2 captures the evolution of SF ABS CDO issuance, further confirming the quality of our classification 
scheme. SF ABS CDOs issued in 1999 and 2000 were truly multi-sector CDOs. Mortgage-related securities 
accounted for only 21% of CDO issuance balances. In 2003, over half of the CDOs were made up of residential 
mortgages or other SF ABS CDOs. By 2006, SF ABS CDOs were effectively subprime CDOs, dominated by 
subprime and other SF ABS CDOs. Subprime bonds became the primary collateral because dealers could 





D.  Where Did BBB Subprime MBS and CDO Subordinated Bonds Get Placed? 
With the identification of the population of SF ABS CDOs, we can provide some of our most astounding 
findings, as we track the placement of subprime bonds and CDSs into CDOs, and CDO bonds into other CDOs 
and CDO
2s. While the placement mechanism is complicated, it is traceable. Subprime bonds were directly 
placed into CDOs, in whole or in part; others were “referenced” in the form of CDSs, of any size, against the 
bonds. Likewise, CDO bonds and CDO CDSs can be traced through to other CDOs and CDO
2s. We do this 
through each security’s CUSIP, which is listed as collateral in the CDOs in Intex. 
 
First, we trace the placement of subprime bonds and CDSs into the CDOs. As shown in the top panel of Table 
3, only 11% of HE bonds originally rated AAA issued between 1998 and 2007 were placed into CDOs, while 
71% of AA-rated bonds, 78% of A-rated bonds, and 79% of BBB-rated bonds were placed or referenced in SF 
ABS CDOs, respectively. More important, the number of occurrences of lower-rated bonds being placed or 
referenced in SF ABS CDOs is far greater. More than twice as many AA- and A-rated bonds were placed or 
referenced in SF ABS CDOs as were issued (206% and 250%). For BBB-rated bonds issued, the 5,496 
subprime bonds were placed or referenced in the 727 CDOs a total of 36,901 times!
24 In Section II.B, we 
described why subprime MBS were so highly correlated. The manner in which subprime MBS were placed or 
referenced in CDOs increased these correlations further. 
 
When we examine dollar balances, a different picture emerges. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 3, AAA-
rated HE bonds by balance were only 1% of the dollar amount of AAA HE bonds issued and 16% of those 
placed or referenced in CDOs. Balance shares increase as the ratings go down. Note that the BBB-rated bonds 
had larger balances placed or referenced in CDOs than were issued (182%).
25 In short, the demand for BBB-
rated subprime bonds was such that $64 billion of BBB-rated subprime bonds was transformed into $140 billion 
of subprime CDO collateral, more than doubling their initial cash value.  
 
In Table 4 we break out the placement of BBB subprime MBS into CDOs by MBS issuance year. Note that 
starting in 2002 up through the shutdown of the subprime market in late 2006, 88% - 92% of subprime BBB 
bonds were placed into CDOs. In fact, these figures understate the placement, since we only have figures on 
issuance volumes or at period end. Since SF ABS CDOs generally allow replacement of collateral over time, 
additional BBB bonds could have been placed into CDOs after issuance.
 Effectively, the CDO was the vehicle 
through which virtually all BBB-rated subprime bonds were placed in the market after 2001.  
 
But if BBB-rated subprime bonds could not be sold directly into the market, how could dealers sell lower-
rated CDO bonds into the market? Amazingly, the answer is that, for the most part, they did not need to 
sell them. They mostly recycled them into other CDOs and CDO
2s. As shown in Table 5, between 58%- 
74% of the BBB- to AA-rated CDO bond balances were placed into other CDOs and CDO
2s. And they 
did not stop with the cash bonds. They even created CDSs from these CDO bonds. The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission Report (FCIC (2011)) pointed out that the remaining lower-rated CDO bonds landed 
back at the dealers themselves, as they were generally unable to sell them. If this is the case, virtually 
                                                            
24 In practice, only a fraction of a cash MBS was placed into any one CDO, which is one reason counts are so high.  
25 For example, Abacus 2007-AC1, a purely synthetic mezzanine CDO that was part of the SEC enforcement action 
against Goldman Sachs, was composed of 90 CDS totaling $2 billion. Each reference note was exactly one- 
ninetieth of $2 billion, or $22,222,222. The original cash value of the underlying BBB bonds was $1.238 billion. 10 
 
none of the CDO bonds not rated AAA were sold in the market. They were recycled back into CDOs, 
with the aim of creating more AAA-rated CDO bonds.  
You do not need to be a securities valuation expert to know why this was not going to end well. Starting 
in 2002, the subprime market functioned through placement of subprime BBB bonds into CDOs, and the 
recycling of lower-rated tranches of CDOs into other CDOs. Synthetics magnified the risks. What is 
more, it did not take declining house prices for these CDOs to suffer catastrophic losses. Rather, as 
pointed out, HPA only needed to decline to 5% before BBB subprime bonds suffered downgrade risk. In 
this respect mezzanine SF ABS CDOs were the fixed-income equivalent of internet stocks of the 1990s 
because they were structured to unsustainable fundamentals (“5% to 8% HPA for life”).  
Another salient point from this rich body of evidence is that everything was public and, therefore, 
knowable at any time. As we’ve shown, most all securities can be traced to each other and back to their 
source, the subprime mortgage loans. Therefore, while CDOs are complex, their write-downs can be 
estimated in a rigorous way, which we do in Section IV. 
 
III.  Data and Summary Statistics 
 
A.  Data 
Intex warehouses an enormous amount of current and historical deal and collateral information for each 
of its securities, including data and program code for cash flow structures necessary to conduct a full 
valuation of each security. Intex provides information on the CDO deal or tranche-level static variables, 
including CUSIPs, original ratings, issuers, deal and tranche balances, coupons, gross margin spreads, 
underwriters, collateral managers, collateral type, trigger information, and other variables. All data are 
housed in monthly files, with updated performance information provided by trustees.  
 
The collateral-related Intex information for SF ABS CDOs is not as readily accessible for all CDO deals 
as are the deal-level variables. To obtain the original collateral assets for the 727 CDOs, we applied the 
Intex API (application programming interface) to directly access its CMO descriptor indicator (CDI) and 
CMO descriptor update (CDU) files. CDI is a static file used for both the initial descriptive and cash flow 
information of the transaction, while CDU files contain, depending on the reporting period, the quarterly 
or semi-annual bond and collateral information such as payments, balances, and triggers. Historical CDU 
files provide snapshot information at the specified month. Given that CDOs are not consistently reported 
as of the deal closing date in Intex, our API needed to look through the CDI and CDU files to access the 
first available collateral asset information for each individual deal.  
 
Since SF ABS CDOs are 144A deals, collateral asset information from Intex is not as consistent and 
uniform as for purely public deals. Of the 727 CDOs, 10 transactions have no CUSIP-level collateral 
information. We will use a dummy variable for deals with and without collateral asset details to test for 
risks in these deals. Second, categorizing the CDO collateral into the seven major asset classes (home 
equity, Alt-A RMBS, prime RMBS, CDO, CMBS, ABS, and other) proved to be complicated by 
inconsistent reporting and missing information from trustees. We therefore supplemented Intex data with 
data from other sources, such as Bloomberg. We were also able to obtain some deal prospectuses from 
industry sources. Three Intex data elements — collateral type, deal type, and asset sub type — are used to 
classify collateral assets. Where necessary, issuer names are populated based on industry experience. 11 
 
CDO trustees also report asset information in an inconsistent manner for synthetic CDS. Many deals list 
the synthetic position line item twice, one with the real CUSIP and the second with a dummy CUSIP, 
with actual contributing balances both referencing the same asset. Consolidating the data line items for 
synthetic positions presented a cumbersome, but ultimately successful, process for finalizing the data set 
and in reporting on synthetic balances. Finally, data flags for synthetic credit default swaps and fixed rate 
bonds are not populated for all of the collateral assets in the Intex data pull. We specifically reviewed the 
missing data flags for synthetic positions on individual deals.  
 
B.  Summary Statistics 
In Table 6 we compute summary statistics for the 727 SF ABS CDO deals for the variables we use in our 
regression analysis. As for collateral assets, Home Equity (HE) dominates the collateral, averaging 56% 
of all CDO assets. Other CDOs are the next most common class at 14%, CMBS next at 9%, with Alt-A 
MBS next at 7%. No other asset group has more than 5%. Synthetics make up 28% of all CDO assets. 
The average CDO has 137 different assets with average deal size at $863 million; the largest deal was just 
over $5 billion at issuance. Each deal averaged 7 tranches, with a maximum of 15. 
 
Since we will be conducting a separate analysis of the AAA bonds, we include some summary statistics 
used in the multivariate analysis. Average coupons on AAA bonds averaged 103 basis points (bps) on the 
fixed-rate bonds; floater margins average 44 bps. Bond balances average $251 million but are as high as 
$3.2 billion. Subordination averaged around 24% but goes as high as 87% for the “super-senior” AAAs.  
 
IV.  Valuation Exercise for SF ABS CDOs 
 
The next step in our analysis is to compute principal write-downs, both actual and expected, for the $641 
billion of securities in the 727 SF ABS CDOs. In this section we detail our estimation process and 
summarize our findings. In subsection A, we calculate principal write-downs on all liquidated deals as of 
March 2011 . In subsection B, we describe our methodology for estimating expected write-downs for the 
non-liquidated deals and report the results. In subsection C, we sum up.  
 
A.  Losses on Liquidated SF ABS CDOs 
We begin our valuation exercise by cumulating what we should already know: the principal dollar write-
down of deals liquidated as of March 2011. The process for determining the principal write-down 
involves retrieving, for each reporting period, the principal received for each tranche. Principal write-
downs for tranche i is defined as the original balance of tranche i less aggregated principal received by 
tranche i up to termination time T:  
(1)        ,            ,    ∑    , 
 
     
where  
WD ,T   principal writedown of tranche i at termination T, 
Balance ,O   balance of tranche i at origination, and 
PR ,    principal received by tranche i at time n. 
 
To obtain principal write-downs for deal j composed of tranches 1 to m, we simply sum the principal 
write-downs across all tranches: 12 
 
 
(2)         ,    ∑    , 
 
     
where  
WD ,T   principal writedown of deal j at termination T on m tranches. 
 
The challenge of obtaining principal received stems from the lack of reporting of the final liquidation 
waterfall report by trustees. While trustees always report when a deal is active, reports are not always 
available for final liquidation waterfall reports. Therefore, we use Bloomberg and industry sources to 
obtain the information needed to do our accounting for the all-important final reporting period of 
liquidation proceeds.
26 We also used these sources to cross-check against each other for reasonableness to 
ensure we are aggregating write-downs correctly. We believe that our final tallies are the most accurate 
accounting possible without having all final trustee liquidation reports. 
 
As shown in Table 7, for the 727 SF CDO deals in the database, 213 transactions totaling $208 billion 
have either been paid down or liquidated as of March 2011. Total deal write-downs on liquidated SF ABS 
CDOs total $161 billion, or 78%, of the original $208 billion of deal balances. As expected, deal write-
downs increase by vintage. Write-down percentages for early vintages, 2000 to 2002, range from 5% to 
9%, confirming the fact that earlier vintages of SF ABS CDOs benefited from the booming housing 
market and better diversification in the pools. Write-downs reached 18% by 2003 and escalated sharply 
thereafter, with 2006 and 2007 vintages reaching 82% and 88%, respectively.   
 
B.  Methodology for Estimating Write-Downs on Non-liquidated SF ABS CDOs 
For the 514 non-liquidated deals, estimating write-downs is a bottom-up approach from the underlying 
collateral, involving four separate steps. The first step parallels what we did in the last subsection: take an 
accounting of principal received (up to time t) for each tranche and each deal (as in equations (1) and (2)). 
As of March 2011, $222.3 billion of active collateral balances were still reported out of an original 
issuance balance of $432.6 billion. Of this, $75.9 billion of principal has been received. Netting this out 
of $432.6 billion and subtracting the active balances leaves principal write-downs of $134.4 billion.
 27 As 
we do with liquidated deals, we use Bloomberg and industry sources to cross-check our figures. 
 
Step two is to estimate or, in some cases, obtain a fair value for the $222.3 billion of still-active collateral. 
For our valuation exercise, we apply the approach used in Goodman, et al. (2008) and assume these fair 
values are expected liquidation proceeds for the remaining collateral assets. Thus,  
 
(3)           ,   ∑    ,            , 
 
     
where  
E LP ,     expected liquidation proceeds of deal j at time t,  
FV ,    fair value of collateral asset k at time t,and 
                                                            
26 We would like to thank Justin Pauley from RBS Global Banking & Markets for sending us RBS Global’s 
Structured Finance CDO Status Reports as well as a spreadsheet of pay-down information on a subset of the CDOs. 
27 The calculation is $432.6B - $222.3B - $75.9B = $134.4B. Note that write-downs are not necessarily immediately 
recorded to the tranches (the liabilities) when the collateral (the assets) is written down. Thus, the tranches have 
“implied write-downs,” with losses needing to be allocated through the waterfall in the Intex software. 13 
 
CBal ,    contributing balance of collateral asset k at time t. 
 
Because of the large numbers of different types of assets and the ways we obtain fair values, we 
summarize our methods for obtaining fair values in Table 8. Of the 514 active SF ABS CDOs, 23,197 
unique securities are still active or being reported.  Two-thirds are residential mortgage bonds, including 
home equity, Alt-A RMBS, and prime RMBS. For these collateral assets, we use proprietary prepayment, 
default, and loss models from a third-party vendor that is a market leader in the industry. We use this third 
party’s vendor research to obtain appropriate “tunings” for prepayment speeds, severities, and default 
transitions. For discount rates, we estimate credit option-adjusted spreads (CrOASs) and add them to their 
index values, using a combination of market prices on the aforementioned ABX index for HE securities 
and the PrimeX index for prime RMBS securities.
28 For Alt-A bonds, we interpolate between the two, 
assuming that Alt-A bond risk lies between subprime and prime RMBS.
29 Thus, we obtain market-based 
fair values for these underlying HE and RMBS securities.  
 
As shown in Table 8, even though mortgage assets dominate the transactions by balance, there are large 
numbers of other securities that need to be valued. For these, we use a combination of fair value prices 
from a number of pricing vendors and rating agency and vendor models. In cases where no value 
information is available, we use a simple ratings table to estimate fair values on the tiny amount of 
remaining collateral. Pricing information was obtained primarily from three sources: the Interactive Data 
Corporation (IDC), Gifford & Feng Associates, and Bloomberg’s Bval Service. For 710 of the securities, 
we obtained no information at all except for ratings and, in some cases, an asset class. For these securities, 
we use a combination of current rating and asset class risk categories to assign fair values, as described in 
the bottom table within Table 8. We apply further haircuts in the range of 5 to 10 points for more risky 
assets, such as franchise loan ABS. Fortunately, we needed to do this for less than 3% of total assets.  
 
Step three is to run price/yield analytics on the CDO collateral through the Intex cash-flow engine for 
each deal. For the active collateral, each asset contributes its liquidation proceeds to the deal, with the 
aggregate recovery amounts allocated in the Intex software to the various tranches of the CDOs according 
to the priority of principal and interest payments (i.e., the “waterfall”). The waterfall also adjusts for all 
structural features that can divert cash flows to more senior tranches. We use the “liquidation mode,” 
which results in expected prices for the CDO tranches without the need to address the discount rate issues 
associated with evaluating significantly illiquid and deeply distressed securities, since theoretically the 
liquidation occurs immediately and the resulting cash flows are allocated at time t. Thus, 
 
(4)          ,          ,              /        ,  
where  
E P ,     expected price of tranche i at time t, 
Waterfall    priority of principal and interest payments from deal j, and 
Balance ,    balance of tranche i at time t. 
 
                                                            
28 Similar in design to the ABX, PrimeX is an index developed from a basket of prime RMBS securities and is 
publicly traded, thus providing us with market prices to derive OAS and discount rates. For details, see Amherst 
Securities (April 27, 2010). 
29 Exact calculations are available from the authors upon request.  14 
 
For the valuation of the CDOs that contain other SF ABS CDO bonds, we set up a two-stage process by 
first valuing the CDO bonds that have no SF ABS CDOs as collateral and then incorporate the pricing 
results from the first stage with fair values for all other assets to estimate prices for those CDOs that are 
partially or fully collateralized by SF ABS CDOs. For the small number of cases where the CDOs are 
private placements, we use external prices or, as a last resort, our ratings matrix described above.  
 
Our fourth and final step is to calculate tranche-level expected principal write-down amounts for all active 
SF ABS CDOs by subtracting the historical principal received and the expected recovery values from the 
original balances of the tranches. Thus, 
 
(5)         ,             ,    ∑    ,         ,             , 
   
     
where  
E WD ,     expected principal writedown of tranche i at time t. 
 
As in equation (2), to obtain expected principal write-downs for deal j, we simply sum principal write-
downs across all tranches: 
 
(6)          ,   ∑      , 
 
      
where  
E WD ,     principal writedown of deal j at time t on m tranches. 
 
Write-down percentages for both the tranche and the deal level are also calculated by dividing the dollar 
write-down amounts by the respective tranche or deal original balances. As shown in Table 9, the 514 
active SF ABS CDOs as of March 2011 with original deal balance of $432.6 billion are expected to write 
down $257.8 billion, 60% of the original deal balance. Starting from the 2001 vintage, the estimated 
write-down percentages increase monotonically over the years, from 34% in 2003 to 80% by 2007, a 
familiar pattern from earlier tables. 
 
C.  Summing Up 
As summarized in Table 10, we estimate that, all told, total principal write-downs on SF ABS CDO will 
reach $420 billion, 65% of the $641 billion of total issuance. Note that, as of March 2011, 71% of the 
write-downs have already occurred, with the remaining 29% of write-downs expected from the $222 
billion of active collateral. Thus, while one can quibble with our valuation methodology, most write-
downs from the SF ABS CDO market have already occurred; so our final write-down estimate will likely 
not be too far off the mark.  These write-down estimates are astounding by any measure, more so when 
considering the sheer size of the SF ABS CDO market. When Goodman et al. (2008, p. 269) conducted a 
comparable bottom-up estimation of losses on 420 subprime-backed CDOs, they described their loss 
estimates as “indicative of the greatest ratings and risk management failure ever.” Their loss rates, 
computed in early 2008, are substantially lower than ours.
30  
                                                            
30For example, their expected loss rates on the senior AAA mezzanine bonds in 2006-07 averaged 43%, while our 
figures average over 70%.  15 
 
Write-downs show a sharply escalating pattern by vintage (Table 11). Between 1999 and 2003, write-
downs range from 20%-29%, comparatively low by these standards, but still substantial, showing that no 
vintage of SF ABS CDOs was immune from the very large write-downs experienced in the SF ABS CDO 
market. Write-downs in the earlier vintages reflect large losses suffered by the multi-sector CDOs during 
the recession of the early 2000s. Write-downs rise to 44% for the 2004 vintage and then rise 
monotonically to 84% by 2007. Write-downs in the 2005-07 vintages are especially heavy; these vintages 
constitute 80% of issuance (see Table 2) and generate 90% of write-downs.  
These expected write-down percentages, given subordination levels reported in Figure 1, mean that most 
bonds rated below AAA have been or are likely to be completely written off, with substantial write-
downs for AAA bonds. This is confirmed in Table 12, which summarizes write-downs at the tranche level 
by original ratings. Write-down distributions reported show that no tranche is unaffected, with write-
downs on the originally senior AAA tranches showing average write-downs of 55%. The junior AAA 
class shows an average write-down of 80%, 100% for the median bond. The write-downs experienced by 
the AAA bonds are the most damaging, since these bonds had the lowest capital charges and formed some 
of the collateral used to secure debt in other markets, most notably in the asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) market (see Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009)). All bonds rated below AAA have average write-
downs above 90%, with close to three-quarters or more facing complete write-downs. 
 
V.  Determinants of SF ABS CDO Losses  
 
Now that we have estimated write-down percentages on SF ABS CDO deals and tranches, our final 
analysis involves examining the determinants of these write-downs. In the seminal paper by Barnett-Hart 
(2009, p. 34), which uses LehmanLive and a smaller proprietary sample, she laments that she did not have 
“a direct measure of CDO loss available.” Since we have estimated write-downs, we are able to extend 
her work in important ways, starting with a dependent variable that gives a direct estimate of write-
downs, at both the deal and the tranche level. We have several other advantages as well. Our sample is 
comprehensive, much more complete than LehmanLive or other sources. Our access to Intex CDU files 
allows us to develop our own variables with source data. This proved especially helpful when 
complexities in the deal structures, which were many, gave us opportunities to customize and standardize 
variables. As we show, the Intex software also includes many additional variables on the deal structures 
that can affect performance. Finally, we have an additional two years of performance, allowing us much 
more information on performance.  
 
In subsection A, we conduct multivariate analysis on deal performance. In subsection B we examine 
dealer fixed effects. Finally, in subsection C we conduct analysis at the tranche level, but only on the 
AAA-rated bonds, since lower-rated bonds are mostly fully written down.  
 
A.  The Effects of Deal Characteristics on Deal Performance 
Our modeling approach is to conduct an analysis of the variance of write-down percentages on SF ABS 
CDO deals using ordinary least squares (OLS). Our first set of regressions tests our model to determine 
which set of deal characteristics explains write-down percentages on SF ABS CDOs. Write-down 
percentages, a combination of actual and expected write-downs, are regressed on key characteristics of 
the CDOs. Our basic specification is as follows: 16 
 
 
(7)                                         ,     ,    ,        &          . 
 
Deal characteristics are broken down into four very broad categories that generate testable hypotheses. 
Structure refers to the structural characteristics of the deals that can affect performance; our hypothesis 
here is that more complex structures result in worse performance (Coval, et al. (2009)). Larger deal sizes, 
a larger number of assets, and a larger number of tranches can all add to increased complexity and 
increase write-downs. In contrast, static deals, which don’t allow replacement of assets when existing 
assets pay down or default, will decrease complexity and potentially reduce write-downs. Finally, not 
having deal triggers to protect bondholders in the event of unexpectedly high write-downs is a direct 
benefit to equity and lower-rated tranches, increasing risk and write-downs. 
 
Variations in risk are also affected by the types of assets in the deals, discussed in Section II.C. Many 
studies have found that higher shares of nontraditional lending, packaged into home equity and Alt-A 
securities, should result in much poorer performance (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund (2008); Mian and Sufi 
(2008); Demyanyk and Van Hemert ( 2011); and others). Likewise, higher concentrations of CDOs will 
result in worse performance, since CDOs are made up predominantly of nontraditional mortgage 
collateral, particularly in later vintages. Other asset classes that performed better during the crisis should 
positively affect performance; these include prime mortgage securities, CMBS, and ABS. Of course, this 
is hard to ascertain ex ante, since performance of the underlying securities depends on the risk of the 
assets chosen and structural features of the underlying securities themselves. If the strategy was to pick 
higher margin (i.e., riskier) securities, these nonmortgage asset classes might not decrease risk at all. 
 
Risk characteristics measure the effects of the overall structure itself on deal performance. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, mezzanine SF ABS CDOs, since they are made up of BBB-rated securities, should perform 
worse than their high-grade counterparts. Likewise, purely synthetic and hybrid SF ABS CDOs should 
perform worse than purely cash CDOs, given the ability to quickly manufacture CDOs with synthetic 
collateral. The 48 CDO
2s should perform worse still, since they are made up primarily of subordinated 
bonds of SF ABS CDOs, particularly in later years, as shown in Figure 2. The weighted average rating 
factor (WARF) determines the classifications for mezzanine and high-grade CDOs; thus, higher WARFs 
should lead to higher write-downs.  
 
Finally, vintage effects and controls will also affect performance. There is ample research to document 
the decline in underwriting standards that fueled the housing boom and the extraordinary expansion of 
lending. In addition, house prices peaked in 2005 and started declining in 2006. These combinations of 
effects suggest that more recent vintages will perform much worse than earlier vintages (Goodman, et al. 
(2008)). Liquidated deals should also perform worse, since, as mentioned above, the worst-performing 
deals are often liquidated first. Ten of the deals provided no asset information whatsoever, which could be 
a sign of higher risk.  
  
Overall, the regression results reported in Table 13 show that all the major risk dimensions discussed 
above have a significant effect on CDO write-down percentages, explaining 57% to 59% of variation in 
write-downs. We show three specifications of the model. The first regression includes all characteristics 17 
 
and controls, our full model. Since asset and deal risk characteristics are so collinear, our second and third 
regressions treat each category separately along with the other effects. 
 
As shown in Table 13, for the full model (1), all major groupings contributed significantly to explaining 
variation in write-down percentages. For the deal characteristics, results show that having more assets in 
the deal significantly increases write-down percentages, consistent with the hypothesis that more assets 
result in more complex deal structures, thereby increasing write-down percentages.  
 
For the asset characteristics, several groupings contributed significantly to risk, with no major grouping 
decreasing risk. The share of synthetic collateral has a coefficient of 0.15. The way to interpret this 
coefficient is that a $1 increase in synthetic collateral increases write-downs by 15 cents. Home equity 
securities increase write-down percentages by 16%, Alt-A RMBS increase write-down percentages by 
20%, and CDO collateral increases write-down percentages by 32%. The other asset categories have 
positive coefficients but were not significant. Still, it is important that none of these categories decreased 
write-downs, suggesting that riskier securities were placed into CDOs across the board. (We will further 
confirm this below.) Interestingly, the coefficient on Alt-A collateral was larger than that on home equity, 
which we interpret as consistent with higher unexpected write-downs in Alt-A securities, as evidenced by 
much lower subordination levels in Alt-A bonds relative to subprime (see Figure 1). This may also 
explain why prime RMBS did not decrease the risk of the SF ABS CDOs, since prime RMBS bonds had 
even lower subordination than Alt-A RMBS or home equity. Not surprisingly, CDO collateral had the 
largest coefficient of all (32%), since these subordinated bonds, dominated by SF ABS CDOs, are 
expected to be fully written off (Table 12).  
 
The last two categories in Model (1) of Table 13, deal risk characteristics and controls, are all mostly 
dummy variables; so they have a different interpretation. For these coefficients, they represent the 
variation in risk relative to an omitted category. For the deal risk characteristics, only the flag on pure 
synthetic collateral was weakly significant, and negative, relative to cash CDOs. These variables are 
mostly collinear with the asset characteristics, which may be why they are not particularly important in 
Model (1).  
 
For the controls category, the issue year dummy variables are positive and significant starting in 2004 
(relative to the 1999-2000 cohorts) and increase in significance in a monotonic way up to the shutdown of 
the SF ABS CDO market in 2007. Relative to issue years 1999 and 2000, issue years 2001-2003 were 
negative and insignificant; no doubt these vintages benefited from the greater diversification of the pools 
(from Figure 2) as well as favorable market conditions in housing. Starting with 2004, collateral was 13% 
riskier than in the 1999-2000 cohort, increasing monotonically to 47% by 2007. Clearly, the huge rise in 
SF ABS CDO issuance combined with increasing concentrations of mortgage securities, with so much 
coming at the peak of the housing market in 2005 and thereafter, was a major determinant of write-downs 
in these CDOs. Also significant was the risk on the 10 deals that reported no asset information, which 
meant, in effect, that investors were likely relying entirely on ratings. Losses on liquidated deals are 
higher but not significant after controlling for other effects.  
 
Since the asset and deal risk characteristics are so collinear, in Table 13 we report results of treating each 
category separately in Models (2) and (3). The effect of omitting the deal risk characteristics in Model (2) 18 
 
has the effect of increasing the coefficients on home equity and Alt-A collateral but decreasing the 
coefficients on the synthetic and CDO collateral. Omitting the asset characteristics in Model (3) has the 
effect of increasing the effects of deal risk characteristics, since the hybrid and CDO
2 flags are significant 
and positive. Omitting assets also makes the intercept term significant, suggesting a large fixed effect 
from not considering the composition of the assets.  
 
B.  Examining Dealer
31 Fixed Effects 
Perhaps the most important participant in the CDO structure is the dealer, responsible for underwriting, 
marketing, and issuing the deals. To analyze the link between CDO performance and dealers, we add 
dealer fixed effects to our full model (Model 1) estimated in subsection V.A. These regressions examine 
whether the identities of the dealers are significant predictors of performance, after controlling for CDO 
characteristics. The dealers identified match those in Barnett-Hart (2009). 
 
There are two competing hypotheses on dealer effects that we can test with our model here. One 
hypothesis is that the dealers most actively short selling the mortgage market, notably Goldman Sachs 
and Deutsche Bank,
32 would experience the highest principal write-downs, since they had the most to gain 
from poor performance of the mortgage market and would be inclined to push out worse deals. 
Alternatively, the second hypothesis is that the worst-performing deals would be made by firms that had 
substantial positions themselves in SF ABS CDOs, since they would be the ones most likely to deal up to 
the point at which the market crashed (see Lewis (2010)). So the strategy is to add dealer fixed effects 
into the full model for the 17 largest dealers and then rank the coefficients from least to greatest relative 
to the omitted category (which is the collection of smaller dealers).
33 
 
Results in Table 14 show evidence of a significant dealer effect on CDO performance and provides the 
strongest support for the second hypothesis. When the dummy variables for the 17 largest dealers are 
included, the adjusted R
2 for Model (1) increases by more than 1%, to 58.5%. The coefficients are 
significant for the three worst performers. The worst performer, Morgan Stanley, had loss rates that, after 
controlling for deal effects, were 8.4% higher on average than the collection of smaller dealers. What is 
most interesting about these results is that the four worst performers, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bear 
Stearns, and UBS, all took substantial write-downs on SF ABS CDOs, often from holding the senior-most 
tranches of the CDOs they underwrote.
34 Heavy write-downs in CDOs were in and of themselves not a 
conclusive factor, however, since Merrill was only the ninth worst and otherwise not significantly worse 





31 In Barnett-Hart (2009) and other sources, dealers are referred to as underwriters. In practice, the terms are used 
interchangeably. Our preference for “dealer” avoids confusion with underwriters of mortgage loans. 
32 The shorting of the subprime mortgage market was the basis for the SEC lawsuit against Goldman Sachs. Lewis 
(2010) reports that Greg Lippman, of Deutsche Bank, was actively shorting the subprime market as early as 2006. 
33 We conducted an F test to test the null hypothesis that the dealer fixed effects were all equal to zero. Our F 
statistic (F=2.27, p=0.0025) shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
34 According to Creditflux (2009), Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bear Stearns, and UBS took, respectively, $7.8 
billion, $34.1 billion, $2.3 billion, and $21.8 billion of write-downs on “ABS of CDOs” during the crisis. 
35 Barnett-Hart (2009) came to the same conclusion after she replaced CDO reported losses with the firm fixed 
effects in her regressions.  19 
 
C.  The Determinants of Performance of AAA-Rated SF ABS CDO Bonds 
Our final set of regressions examines the performance of SF ABS CDO tranches, in particular, the AAA-
rated securities, including both the junior and senior AAA-rated securities. Initially, we had intended to 
conduct a multivariate analysis on all the rated bonds until we saw that virtually all bonds rated below 
AAA have been or are expected to be fully written down (see Table 12). As a result, our analysis in this 
section is limited to the AAA-rated tranches, where a much larger share has at least some variation. The 
major reason to consider this analysis separately is that this allows us to examine more characteristics of 
the structures and, very importantly, the performance of the rating agencies that rated the bonds.
36 So our 
strategy is to add rating agency fixed effects and tranche-level characteristics to the variables of the full 
model that apply to our multivariate analysis on AAA bonds. All told, 1,840 bonds were either rated 
AAA, or we could infer an AAA rating from the deal structure.
37 
 
Our expanded regression, presented in Table 15, shows that the additional tranche features contribute 
significantly to the variation in write-downs but that relative rating agency effects generally do not. For 
the rating agency variables, we assigned a dummy variable for each grouping of the three rating agencies.  
For these rating agency fixed effects, performance in variation is relative to the omitted group, which is 
the group of 364 AAA bonds rated by all three rating agencies. By far the largest grouping is from the 
AAA bonds rated by Moody’s and S&P, which together rated 1,306 AAA bonds, 71% of the total. For 
these bonds the coefficient is small and positive but insignificant. The 21 bonds rated by Moody’s and 
Fitch showed a large positive and significant coefficient, and the 23 bonds rated by S&P alone shows a 
large and significant negative coefficient. But the small number of bonds associated with these groupings 
could easily be the result of idiosyncratic factors. The most important finding is that the three biggest 
groups (ratings by all three rating agencies, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch), which account for 94% of the 
rated AAA bonds, are not significantly different from each other. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that rating agency models were not much different from each other.
38 In short, a consensus 
formed around valuations at the rating agencies. The 46 securities not rated by any of the rating agencies 
had a negative coefficient but was not significant, suggesting that AAA securities not rated by the three 
major rating agencies performed no better. 
 
Several of the tranche characteristics are significant and quite important economically. Most important, a 
higher margin on the floating rate securities has a very large coefficient and is highly significant. Even 
after controlling for deal, asset, and tranche effects, higher discount margins translate into significantly 
greater risks, with a coefficient of 0.16. Since 1,613 of the securities (88%) are floating rate, this effect is 
material. Higher margins are generated by placing higher yielding, and riskier, securities into the deals. 
This was a primary reason for the placement of large amounts of BBB-rated subprime securities into the 
CDOs and may well have been a motive for adding in riskier BBB-rated bonds as well as riskier securities 
                                                            
36 Rating agencies do not rate the securities trusts, generally only the fixed-income parts of the deal, the bonds. In 
our 727 CDOs, 705 of the securities are not rated, mainly because they are equity tranches.  
37 There were 123 bonds that were not rated, but which were senior in structure to the AAA-rated bonds. Since 
rating agencies do not assign a rating above AAA, we inferred the AAA ratings and assigned them to the appropriate 
rating agency rather than exclude these observations from the analysis.  
38 According to the IOSCO Technical Committee (2008, p. 24), a Code of Conduct published by IOSCO in 2004 
made disclosures about rating methodologies transparent enough so that dealers could easily anticipate the level of 
credit enhancement necessary to obtain a desired rating.  The SEC (2008) also pointed out that rating agencies often 
used their own ratings on securities in the CDOs, further increasing uniformity.  20 
 
in other asset classes, judging by the positive coefficients on write-downs for all major asset classes in the 
regression. The subordination-level coefficient is also large at -0.20 and also highly significant. Higher 
levels of subordination translated into smaller write-downs. Likewise, the flag for senior AAA bonds is 
large at -0.21 and is highly significant. Interestingly, the super senior flag, which represented 123 
securities senior to even the AAA-rated bonds, was significant and positive.
39 
 
 As for the other effects, there are some very interesting differences with the deal-level model. For the 
asset characteristics, only the share of synthetics in the securities and share of CDOs significantly 
increased risk. As shown in Figure 2, rising shares of synthetic and CDO collateral came very late in 2006 
and 2007 and were likely subject to more measurement error. They also had a much stronger negative 
effect on the senior-most bonds. The purely synthetic flag was negative and significant, suggesting that 
the knowledge that a deal was purely synthetic was better factored into protection for the AAA 
bondholders than knowledge about the specific share of synthetic collateral in a deal. 
 
Vintage effects were the biggest single factor explaining the variation in write-downs on the deals; they 
are even more so for explaining the variation in AAA bond performance. Vintage effects are significant 
and positive starting in 2003 in the tranche-level model (as opposed to 2004 in the deal-level regression), 
and the coefficient values are much higher in every single year. Clearly, the increasing concentrations of 
mortgage assets in the CDOs, the increasing risks of the securities being placed in the CDOs, and the 
increasing use of synthetic collateral in more recent years all increased risks for the senior-most 
bondholders. Since these were mostly controlled for in the regressions, the vintage effects may have been 
picking up the economic effects on deal performance, as evidenced by house prices peaking in 2005. 
 
VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Before our study, most of what we knew about the size and composition of the “structured finance CDO 
market” came from qualitative accounts (Gorton 2008); anecdotes in books from the popular press (e.g., 
Lewis (2010), McLean and Nocera (2010)); or the rating agencies, whose figures contain only the CDOs 
they rated and which are not classified in a systematic way.
40 Information on write-downs was even more 
difficult to come by, primarily because what information we have received has come from rating agencies 
or investment banks, neither of which is interested in conducting studies on markets that have completely 
shut down. That is why the forensic work and analysis we conduct in this paper are so important. We 
believe that the 727 securities totaling $641 billion of issuance that we identify represent the population of 
securities that traded publicly on the ABS CDO trading desks of the largest financial firms active in the 
market. After identifying the securities, we then examine the linkages of SF ABS CDOs to subprime 
securities and document the enormous extent of the referencing of these securities in SF ABS CDOs and 
the multiplication of risks created by the $201 billion of synthetic collateral (see Table 2). While many 
have speculated on these linkages, we document that some 5,500 of BBB-rated subprime securities were 
placed or referenced into these CDOs some 37,000 times, transforming $64 billion of BBB subprime 
bonds into $140 billion of CDO assets (Table 3). We are also able to document that few of the lower rated 
                                                            
39 For these bonds, they were technically unrated. Since they are senior to all the AAA-rated bonds, we inferred the 
raters in these cases by matching the raters on the AAA bonds just below them in the structure. 
40 The FCIC (2011) used data from Moody’s, since it couldn’t get figures from independent sources. The FCIC’s 
total figures were around 10% higher than ours, likely for definitional reasons. 21 
 
tranches of the CDOs were ever sold but were recycled into other CDOs to create more AAA CDO 
bonds. Not surprisingly, this led to catastrophic loss. We believe our expected write-down figure of $420 
billion is close to the tally of ultimate write-downs that will occur, if only because over 70% of these 
write-downs have already been realized (Table 10). Finally, we conduct an analysis of variance on the 
determinants of write-downs in the SF ABS CDO market, which we elaborate on below. Overall, we 
provide strong support for the conclusion in Goodman, et al. (2008, p. 269) that the SF ABS CDO market 
meltdown is “indicative of the greatest rating agency and risk management failure ever.” 
 
What is not fully appreciated is just how susceptible SF ABS CDOs were to catastrophic loss after they 
became subprime CDOs. CDO dealers and rating agencies created structures that gave AAA bondholders 
of mezzanine CDOs levels of subordination comparable to those provided the AAA mortgage bonds. The 
low correlation assumption among subprime bonds that justified these CDO subordination levels was 
flawed because diversification was taking place within the subprime MBS (Coval, Jurek and Stafford 
(2009)). The enormous amount of cross-referencing of BBB subprime and CDO bonds among the SF 
ABS CDOs undoubtedly exacerbated this problem. As we describe in Section II, subprime mortgage 
losses needed to reach only 1.5 to 2.5 times the consensus view on expected losses before the mezzanine 
CDOs would be nearly or completely written down.
41 What is more, house prices did not need to decline 
before these CDOs could experience write-downs. According to Lehman (2005), HPA only needed to 
decline to 5% before BBB subprime bonds—and the CDOs—suffered downgrade risk. In this sense, SF 
ABS CDOs were the fixed income equivalent of internet stocks of the 1990s, since their collateral was 
structured to unsustainable fundamentals (“5% to 8% HPA for life”). 
 
Our multivariate analysis of the determinants of the losses confirms that firms were choosing securities to 
place into SF ABS CDOs primarily for yield. It is an important find that none of the different asset 
categories in these CDOs lowered risk, suggesting that riskier securities were placed into CDOs across all 
major asset classes (Table 13). When examining the performance of AAA-rated bonds, higher discount 
margins were a major determinant of losses (Table 15).  
 
As for the dealers at the center of SF ABS CDO issuance, our results support the hypothesis that most 
were not fully aware of the risks in the CDOs, since the dealers that underwrote the worst-performing 
CDOs (Morgan Stanley, Citicorp, Bear Stearns, and UBS) all suffered large and debilitating losses from 
the “super-senior” AAA bonds of the CDOs they underwrote and held (see FCIC (2011) and Lewis 
(2010) for a list of firms that held CDO risk). Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, which we later learned 
were selling off their risk and shorting the subprime mortgage market, were 7
th and 11
th in terms of rank 
and not statistically different in terms of write-downs from the small issuers. This makes sense given the 
size of the market. To absorb $641 billion in SF ABS CDOs required the participation of the largest 
players in the financial system.  
 
                                                            
41 The IOSCO Technical Committee’s report (2008, pp. 3-4) points out that “some observers argue that many of 
these [AAA] “low risk” tranches…are only “low risk” insofar as no systemic shock or other widespread adverse 
event has an effect on all assets of a given type that comprise the underlying cash flow for a CDO.” Our point is that 
it did not take a systemic shock to severely impair or completely wipe out the value of these AAA CDO bonds. 
Rather, it only took only slightly higher than expected losses. 22 
 
With our analysis, we believe we have shown conclusively that the financial crisis was not brought on by 
the lack of data on the RMBS and HE securities or by disclosure limitations on SF ABS CDO securities. 
One of the enduring myths of the crisis is that loan-level data on the mortgage securities in these CDOs 
were not available to properly value these CDOs.
42 Loan-level data were available on most securities 
directly through Intex, with data on most others available from third-party vendors. Disclosures on 
securities recommended in the reforms by the IOSCO Technical Committee (2008, p. 3-4) were already 
mostly available for the SF ABS CDOs. For investors, it was all available upon request.  
 
But clearly data quality was a problem, fueled as it was by declining underwriting standards. One very 
valid point on the data is that the quality of the data being provided deteriorated significantly in the build-
up to the crisis because of declining underwriting standards, by the IOSCO’s reckoning, “beginning in 
late 2004 and extending into early 2007.”
43 Demyanyk and Van Hemert ( 2011) argue that “deterioration 
in loan quality—adjusted for observed characteristics and macroeconomic circumstances—deteriorated 
monotonically between 2001and 2007.” What we need to get a better understanding of is how the 
feedback loop of demand for subprime mortgage bonds for CDOs, combined with the vertical integration 
of sellers/servicers and dealers, contributed to the downward spiral of underwriting standards and data 
quality. Establishing such a causal link empirically is quite challenging but quite important to developing 
a more complete understanding of the crisis.  
 
What of the rating agency models? Our precursory examination of write-downs tied to rating agency 
ratings on AAA SF ABS CDO bonds does not show any significant differences between the rating 
agencies in terms of explaining expected losses (Table 15). This is consistent with the view that the three 
major rating agencies employed similar models. One issue uncovered by our analysis is the enormous 
amount of cross-referencing, noted above, of the same securities in these 727 CDOs. The process of 
assigning ratings deal by deal meant that little opportunity existed to evaluate how the enormous amount 
of cross-referencing was affecting the asset correlation assumptions in the rating agency models. More 
fundamentally, based on subordination levels, what we document is a disconnect between ratings done on 
subprime MBS versus those done on subprime CDOs. This is certainly worthy of further study.  
 
More fundamentally, the colossal write-downs suffered call into question the entire modeling framework 
for CDOs, certainly for its application to ABS, but perhaps also for other asset classes as well (see 
Heitfield (2009)). This is a most important point, since these models are still being employed in corporate 
CDO and CLO CDO markets.  
 
A final area for future work concerns further analyzing risk management practices at the nation’s largest 
financial institutions. What compelled banks to take on such enormous exposures of subprime risk 
through their exposure to SF ABS CDOs? One explanation uncovered in our analysis is that the 
concentration of subprime debt in SF ABS CDOs came much later, in 2006-07 (Figure 2).  So perhaps the 
speed with which these CDOs became vehicles for placement of subprime debt, and increasingly 
synthetic debt, was not fully appreciated at issuance. Another point is that existing CDOs allowed for 
replacement of 2006-07 subprime bonds into these older vintages of CDOs as CDO balances declined, 
                                                            
42 Lewis (2010) quotes Wall Street and rating agency analysts, who claimed that dealers were withholding this 
information from them. As we demonstrate, RMBS and HE loan-level data were available from other sources.  
43 See IOSCO Technical Committee (2008, p. 2). 23 
 
which meant they were still exposed to later vintages of subprime risk. Analyzing the flows of securities 
in these CDOs over time is a logical extension of our analysis. 
 
What is more perplexing is how these firms did not uncover the potential for catastrophic losses in these 
CDOs if market conditions resulted in even slightly higher than expected losses. These risks were well 
within the ranges of the banks’ risk models, which meant these firms should have, at a minimum, been 
holding capital for these potential exposures. The SF ABS CDO market may be the quintessential case 
study for the prescient warnings laid out in Rajan (2006), in which he warned that “perverse incentives” 
existed so that firms would increase expected short-term profits in exchange for seemingly remote tail 
risk, in the process increasing the systemic risk to the overall financial system. The way this manifested 
itself was through the largest dealers placing their own subordinated subprime and CDO bonds into CDOs 
and CDO
2s and retaining the “super-senior” tranches of the CDOs (Merrill, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, 
UBS), while others (Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank) passed this risk off to other major players in the 
financial system (e.g., AIG). As we now know, taking on tail risks on such a large scale greatly increased 
systemic risk to the overall system, with disastrous consequences.  Like Rajan (2006), Lang and Jagtiani 
(2010) blame the problem on compensation systems at the largest financial institutions, where business 
line managers earned big bonuses from their investment in SF ABS CDOs, even gaining from the lack of 
transparency in the CDO structures.
44 Clearly, more needs to be done on this subject, as it remains the 
most puzzling aspect of the subprime CDO crisis. 
 
In conclusion, by developing a robust classification for the SF ABS CDO market, we have cleared up 
much confusion about the size, composition, and expected write-downs of the market and how and why it 
came to be dominated by subprime securities. But it is only the beginning of the analysis needed to get a 
full understanding of the subprime CDO crisis, its effects on the markets, and, most important, the 
appropriate policy responses.   
                                                            
44 The FCIC (2011) clearly documents through interviews with senior management at Merrill Lynch, UBS, AIG, 
Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley that these firms and their boards of directors were unaware of the extent of the 
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High Grade Mezzanine Total High Grade Mezzanine Total
1999 1 1 304 304
2000 19 19 6,991 6,991
2001 5 29 34 3,950 10,940 14,891
2002 4 33 37 2,800 14,656 17,456
2003 8 37 45 9,792 15,769 25,561
2004 35 46 81 35,997 22,561 58,558
2005 52 72 124 65,293 43,584 108,877
2006 84 139 223 121,602 110,109 231,711
2007 67 96 163 102,988 73,771 176,759










Year Cash Synthetic Total % Synthetic
1999 304 ‐                     304 0%
2000 6,391 600 6,991 9%
2001 14,891 ‐                     14,891 0%
2002 13,456 3,000 16,456 18%
2003 25,431 ‐                     25,431 0%
2004 52,327 6,186 58,513 11%
2005H1 25,808 3,827 29,636 13%
2005H2 65,071 15,346 80,416 19%
2006H1 52,608 18,501 71,109 26%
2006H2 83,287 77,315 160,602 48%
2007H1 73,948 49,065 123,013 40%
2007H2 26,230 27,516 53,746 51%


















Total Placed in or 
Referenced in CDOs








Share of Occurrences to 
Total Placed in CDOs
AAA 12,948 1,463 11% 2,509 19% 171%
AA 5,486 3,893 71% 11,292 206% 290%
A 5,891 4,579 78% 14,714 250% 321%
BBB 6,993 5,496 79% 36,901 528% 671%






Total Placed in or 
Referenced in CDOs





Share of $ 
Occurrences to 
Total Issued
Share of $ Occurrences 
to Total Placed in CDOs
AAA 2,011,451 160,090 8% 25,897 1% 16%
AA 173,150 125,152 72% 80,449 46% 64%
A 100,183 82,916 83% 71,245 71% 86%
BBB 77,025 64,061 83% 140,046 182% 219%
BB/B 18,002 9,055 50% 7,981 44% 88%












BBB HE Bonds Placed 
or Referenced in CDOs
% BBB Bonds Placed 




Share of $ of BBB 
HE Occurrences to 
Total Issued
Share of $ of BBB HE 
Occurrences to Total 
Placed in CDOs
1998 2,249 1,209 54% 603 27% 50%
1999 1,494 727 49% 435 29% 60%
2000 1,283 904 70% 792 62% 88%
2001 2,213 1,842 83% 1,708 77% 93%
2002 4,426 3,876 88% 3,443 78% 89%
2003 6,941 6,100 88% 6,985 101% 115%
2004 13,300 12,266 92% 21,898 165% 179%
2005H1 8,301 7,664 92% 25,254 304% 330%
2005H2 10,300 9,250 90% 29,934 291% 324%
2006H1 10,086 9,164 91% 34,060 338% 372%
2006H2 8,031 6,922 86% 12,124 151% 175%
2007H1 6,613 3,973 60% 2,706 41% 68%
2007H2 1,789 165 9% 104 6% 63%
Totals 77,025 64,061 83% 140,046 182% 219%
















Total Placed in 
or Referenced 
in CDOs











Total Placed in 
CDOs
Sr AAA 746 72 9.65% 134 17.96% 186.11%
Jr AAA 1,055 539 51.09% 1,572 149.00% 291.65%
AA 802 566 70.57% 2,544 317.21% 449.47%
A 669 416 62.18% 2,402 359.04% 577.40%
BBB 876 473 54.00% 1,739 198.52% 367.65%






Total Placed in 
or Referenced 
in CDOs






Share of $ 
Occurrences to 
Total Issued
Share of $ 
Occurrences to 
Total Placed in 
CDOs
Sr AAA $397,688 $26,934 6.77% $1,490 0.37% 5.53%
Jr AAA $137,852 $54,176 39.30% $18,915 13.72% 34.91%
AA $36,234 $26,837 74.07% $23,387 64.55% 87.15%
A $18,656 $11,881 63.68% $21,193 113.60% 178.38%
BBB $17,769 $10,251 57.69% $9,731 54.76% 94.93%




















2000 4 1,437 82 6%
2001 8 4,172 1,008 9%
2002 7 4,198 207 5%
2003 12 7,673 1,376 18%
2004 10 9,380 7,259 76%
2005 14 13,662 9,899 72%
2006 80 79,652 63,910 82%
2007 78 88,295 78,275 88%






Variables N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
% Collateral Synthetic 727 28.3% 40.9% 0.0% 100.0% 
% Collateral Fixed 727 36.4% 34.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% of Collateral: Home Equity 727 55.7% 28.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
% of Collateral: Alt_A  727 7.4% 11.9% 0.0% 89.0%
% of Collateral: Prime 727 2.8% 6.5% 0.0% 83.2%
% of Collateral: CDO  727 14.2% 20.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
% of Collateral: CMBS  727 8.7% 13.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% of Collateral: ABS 727 4.9% 8.1% 0.0% 49.3%
% of Collateral: Other 727 4.9% 11.5% 0.0% 91.5%
Dummy: Asset Detail  727 0.01 0.12 0 1 
# of Original Assets  719 137.14 52.47 1 394
Deal Original Balance 727  $ 863 M  $ 668 M  $ 5 M  $ 5,049 M
Deal Current Balance  727  $ 558 M  $ 619 M  $ 0 M  $ 4,337 M
Collateral Original Balance 727  $ 882 M  $ 638 M  $ 10 M  $ 4,985 M
# Tranches in the Deal 727 7.10 2.01 1 15
WARF  727 328.25 257.49 1 2820 
AAA Tranche Original Coupon (bps)  1695 103 124 0 787
AAA Tranche Floater Margin (bps) 1696 44 38 0 400
AAA Tranche Original  Balance 1696  $ 251 M  $ 342 M  $ 0 M  $ 3,240 M
AAA Tranche Current Balance  1696  $ 156 M  $ 276 M  $ 0 M  $ 2,339 M



















SF ABS CDOs 1,252 23,816 11% Internal Results
CMBS 1,392 16,612 7% IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (8)
RMBS‐Prime 1,764 13,342 6%
Proprietary Model with Discount Rate =  Index + 400 basis 
points; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (6)
Miscellaneous Private ABS* 1,339 11,684 5%
IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (327)  
or Bloomberg Valuation (7)
CRE/CMBS CDOs 474 6,162 3% IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (137)
High Yield CDOs 608 4,977 2% IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (151)




Trust Preferred CDOs 156 2,767 1% Cordell, Hopkins and Huang (2011)
Credit Card Receivables ABS 77 2,135 1% IDC Pricing




Small Business Loans ABS 124 809 0% IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (8)
Franchise ABS 63 451 0% IDC Pricing
Other CDOs/Collateralized Bond 
Obligations
47 410 0% IDC Pricing; if unavailable, used  Ratings‐Based Pricing (14)
Credit Linked Notes 4 78 0% Ratings‐Based Pricing






























1999 1 304 60 20%
2000 15 5,554 1,765 32%
2001 26 10,719 2,124 20%
2002 30 13,257 3,397 26%
2003 33 17,889 6,105 34%
2004 71 49,178 18,563 38%
2005 110 95,215 51,728 54%
2006 143 152,059 103,492 68%
2007 85 88,464 70,561 80%















Liquidated Deals 46,454 162,015 208,469 78% 39%
Active Deals
Already Pay‐down 75,904 ‐                          75,904 0%
Already Writen‐down ‐                      134,444 134,444 100% 32%
Current Collateral(Expected) 98,937 123,353 222,290 55% 29%
Subtotal for Active Deals 174,841 257,797 432,638 60% 61%















1999 1 304 60 20%
2000 19 6,991 1,847 26%
2001 34 14,891 3,132 21%
2002 37 17,456 3,604 21%
2003 45 25,561 7,481 29%
2004 81 58,558 25,822 44%
2005 124 108,877 61,627 57%
2006 223 231,711 167,402 72%
2007 163 176,759 148,836 84%


















Senior AAA  768  55% 35%  0% 0% 22% 59% 90%  100%
Junior AAA 1072  80% 35%  0% 1% 79% 100% 100%  100%
AA 803  91% 26%  0% 78% 99% 100% 100%  100%
A  669  93% 24%  0% 88% 100% 100% 100%  100%
BBB 876  91% 23%  1% 78% 96% 100% 100%  100%
BB and B  261  95% 16%  76% 91% 99% 100% 100%  100%
Not Rated  716  96% 18%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%
N Obs
Senior 
AAA Junior AAA AA A BBB BB and B  Not Rated
101 4% 10% 88% 66% 93% 67%  82%
168 6% 9% 64% 11% 74% 81%  91%
209 13%  20% 64% 65% 78% 91%  78%
264 16%  44% 61% 63% 64% 93%  93%
495 26%  71% 84% 95% 84% 99%  97%
858 44%  83% 94% 94% 93% 97%  99%
1696 67%  94% 99% 97% 96% 97%  99%























































































































Table 13 (cont’d) 


























































































2  0.5885 0.5838 0.5749 

































































































































































































































































































ABS/CMBS/Other Other CDO SF ABS CDO Other Mortgage Backed Securities Home Equity Synthetics
Note: This table summarizes shares of assets for structured finance ABS CDOs by five asset categories in the bar charts, and also includes shares of synthetic 
collateral in the line plot. Synthetics = CreditDefault Swaps, Home Equity  = Home Equity  Mortgage‐Backed Securities, SF ABS CDO = structured finance asset‐
backed securitycollateralized debt obiligations, ABS = asset‐backed security, CMBS = commercial mortgage‐backed securities, Other = all remaining asset collateral 
within the SF ABS CDO 